Across the states, the status of Daubert reflects an ongoing, uneven transition from older Frye “general acceptance” tests toward reliability centered standards, producing a patchwork of approaches that significantly affect expert practice. Many jurisdictions have now formally adopted Daubert or a close analogue through rulemaking or judicial decision, often by amending state evidence rules modeled on Rule 702 to emphasize reliability, fit, and judicial gatekeeping over mere consensus within a field. States such as Texas and Georgia, for example, apply modified Daubert frameworks that integrate state specific case law but generally track federal concepts of reliable methodology, sufficient factual basis, and relevance to the issues in dispute.
Other states have moved more incrementally, blending Daubert factors with Frye or crafting hybrid standards that vary by subject matter (such as applying Daubert in civil but not criminal cases, or vice versa). New Jersey illustrates this gradualism: while not fully abandoning Frye in name, its supreme court has embraced Daubert’s factor based reliability analysis in criminal cases, signaling a clear shift away from “general acceptance” as the sole benchmark. By contrast, a minority of states continue to adhere largely to Frye, sometimes citing constitutional concerns about gatekeeping that, in their view, may limit access to courts or impinge on the jury’s traditional fact finding role. This divergence means that the same expert theory may face searching reliability scrutiny in one jurisdiction but be evaluated primarily for consensus in another.
Practically, litigators operating in state courts must navigate a jurisdiction specific matrix: pure Daubert, pure Frye, modified Daubert, or unique hybrids. State by state guides underscore that knowing the controlling standard is essential for selecting experts, structuring reports, and planning admissibility challenges. The broader trend, however, points toward increasing adoption of Daubert type reliability analysis, driven by concerns about “junk science” and a desire to harmonize with federal practice, even as debates persist over whether more robust gatekeeping unduly narrows the range of expert testimony presented to juries.